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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                                  
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 We are asked to decide if attendant care services are an 
"allowable expense" under Section 103 of the Pennsylvania No-
Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 40 Pa. Con. Stats. Ann. 
§1009.103 (repealed) ("No-Fault Act") when provided by 
accredited, non-family, medical care providers.0  We must also 
decide if, under the circumstances of this case, this question is 
ripe for adjudication.  
 For the reasons that follow, we answer both inquiries in the 
affirmative.  While we thus agree with the district court’s 
disposition of the two primary issues before it, we also conclude 
that the district court’s judgment fails to clearly adjudicate 
the issues that the parties are entitled to have resolved.  We 
will therefore reverse the district court’s judgment and will 
                                                           
0The No-Fault Act, 40 Pa. Con. Stats. Ann. § 1009.101 et seq., 
was repealed on October 1, 1984, by the Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law, 75 Pa. Con. Stats. Ann. § 1701 et seq.  
However, the terms of the No-Fault Act control the obligations of 
insurers of victims of serious accidents which occurred while the 
Act was in effect and who still suffer from injuries received in 
those accidents.  Drake v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty 
Ins. Co., 601 A.2d 797, 798 (Pa. 1992). 
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remand for further findings of fact and the entry of an 
unambiguous judgment. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 On October 19, 1979, at the age of 18, Lisa Ann Obusek 
suffered a severe spinal cord injury while riding as a passenger 
in an uninsured motor vehicle.0  Lisa's spinal cord was severed 
at approximately the C5-C6 level causing her irreversible 
neurological injury. She was initially treated at Mercy Hospital 
and later transferred to St. Francis General Hospital in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where she underwent a rehabilitation 
program.  She was eventually discharged from St. Francis, and has 
been living at home with her parents ever since.  
 Lisa can move her head and neck but has no use of her legs 
and only limited movement of her arms. She has no grip in her 
hands but is able to feed herself when equipped with a cuff and 
splint. She has no control over her bowels or bladder and 
urinates through a catheter.  Her disabilities are potentially 
life-threatening if not properly managed. Lisa's speech and 
intellectual capacities were not affected by the accident.  
A. Required Care 
 In a medical report dated September 21, 1989, James McCague, 
M.D., set forth the extent of Lisa's physical limitations, and 
noted that those limitations impaired her respiratory functions 
thereby making her susceptible to choking. The report concluded 
that this, along with her susceptibility to life threatening 
                                                           
0In order to avoid confusion between Lisa Ann Obusek and her 
mother, we will refer to Lisa Ann as "Lisa". 
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infection from bed sores, meant that she needed frequent 
monitoring and inspection.  
 In July of 1988,  Erie Independence House, ("EIH")0 
performed a Health Care Evaluation of Lisa to determine what 
products, services and accommodations she needed to achieve 
maximum feasible physical, psychological, social and vocational 
rehabilitation.  The resulting Report was based upon a five day 
evaluation at EIH, a review of Lisa's medical records, and an on-
site evaluation of her home.  The EIH Evaluation made specific 
recommendations as to those things EIH felt essential for Lisa's 
rehabilitation and care, including functional equipment, housing 
modification and adaptations, psychological counseling, physical 
therapy and attendant care services.  The services and 
accommodations EIH recommended included a regimen of specific 
exercises and hygiene.  It also recommended that "Miss Obusek 
should . . .receive Attendant Care for all activities of daily 
living."  EIH Evaluation at 7.  EIH defined attendant care 
services as including, but not limited to, "bowel routines; 
bladder routines; bathing; dressing; weight shifts; transfers; 
hygiene care; range of motion; house cleaning; exercise routines; 
leisure time activities; and wheelchair maintenance, etc."  Id. 
EIH recommended that the attendant care services be provided on a 
twenty-four hour a day basis.  Id.  EIH also recommended that 
Lisa: 
 
1. [r]eceive 68.67 hours weekly . . . of 
direct personal care assistance, with the 
understanding that more hours may be 
necessary if she should become ill. 
 
2. [r]eceive 21.64 hours of ancillary 
assistance weekly, to maintain her living 
environment. 
 
3. [h]ave an attendant available to her for 
the remaining 77.69 hours weekly, after 
personal care and ancillary services are 
completed.  These hours are necessary to 
avoid problems, and give assistance 
throughout the week should problems, based on 
her physical disability occur. 
 
Id. at 6. 
                                                           
0Erie Independence House is a facility which offers attendant 
care and support services to physically disabled, 
mentally alert people. 
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 EIH defines an attendant or personal assistant as a person 
"who facilitates physical or social independency (sic) by doing 
chores required by the disabled person."  Id. at Attachment #10, 
p. 100, quoting GEORGE NELSON WRIGHT, PH.D., TOTAL REHABILITATION at 74 
(1st Ed. 1980).  An attendant "is a paid employee who provides 
regular, in-home personal care. . . . An attendant is often the 
most important person in the life of a disabled individual. 
Attendant care. . . reduces the necessity of institutionalizing 
disabled persons." Id. at 101, quoting TOTAL REHABILITATION at 746-
747.0     
 Staff members of EIH testified that the daily attendant care 
of quadriplegics can be, and usually is, provided by unskilled 
lay persons.  The only requirements for the job are a high school 
diploma, a driver's license and having attained the age of 18. In 
1989, EIH paid attendant care providers at the rate of $5.00 per 
hour. 
 Gilbert Brenes, M.D., Director of the Spinal Cord Injury 
Program at Harmarville Rehabilitation Center in Pittsburgh, and 
the rehabilitation expert hired by Travelers, examined Lisa and 
concluded that she did not require the services of a registered 
or licensed practical nurse to provide the attendant care she 
needs.  He did, however, conclude that Lisa needed 16 hours a day 
of attendant care.  Additionally, he recommended that a licensed 
                                                           
0See also Pennsylvania Attendant Care Services Act, 65 Pa. Con. 
Stats. Ann. § 305 et seq. ("Attendant care services [are]. . 
.those basic and ancillary services which enable an eligible 
individual to live in his home and community rather than in an 
institution and to carry out functions of daily living, self-care 
and mobility. . . .") 
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practical nurse "be available to change the Foley catheter, to 
supervise the attendant care so that is done effectively or at 
any time that [Lisa] runs into respiratory, skin, autonomic or GU 
complications.' Joint Appendix at 473a.      
 Lisa's mother, Anna Rose Obusek, is a high school graduate 
who worked as a part-time bookkeeper before Lisa's accident.  She 
is not a registered nurse or a licensed practical nurse and she 
does not have a license or certification in either medical or 
rehabilitative care.  However, hospital staff advised Mrs. Obusek 
on Lisa's care in the months immediately following Lisa's 
accident, and Mrs. Obusek has provided the attendant care and 
services Lisa has needed to survive since then.  This care 
includes preparation of meals; setting-up of eating utensils; 
cleaning-up after meals, assisting with drinking and taking 
medication; transferring Lisa between bed and wheelchair; 
dressing and undressing; assisting with Lisa's personal hygiene 
and grooming; changing, emptying and cleaning the urine bags; 
bowel stimulation; range-of-motion exercises; changing and 
sterilizing the Foley catheter; cleaning the bedroom; assisting 
in the use of exercise equipment; turning Lisa in bed at night; 
doing laundry; and providing maintenance of wheelchairs.   
  
B. Procedural History 
 Neither Lisa, nor the driver of the car she was riding in 
had automobile insurance at the time of the accident. Therefore, 
Lisa filed an application for no-fault benefits with 
Pennsylvania's Assigned Claims Plan. The Assigned Claims Plan is 
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an entity created pursuant to section 108 of the No-Fault Act, 40 
Pa.C.S.A. § 1009.108, (repealed), to provide basic no-fault loss 
benefits to victims of motor vehicle accidents who have no other 
source of basic loss benefit coverage. The Plan initially 
assigned Lisa's claim to Allstate Insurance Company for 
evaluation and processing.  Lisa requested coverage for all 
"products, services and accommodations" required for her "maximum 
feasible restoration/rehabilitation" pursuant to the No-Fault 
Act, including modifications to her parents' home, a modified van 
to allow for transportation, and 24 hour a day attendant care 
services.  
 Allstate initially denied Lisa's claim for basic loss 
benefits, and she responded by suing Allstate in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Obusek v. Allstate Insurance 
Company, No. G.D. 79-27948 (C.P. Alleg. Cty. 1979).  That matter 
was not litigated, however, because a settlement was reached 
whereby Allstate agreed to pay a variety of benefits, including 
the cost of building an addition to the Obusek home.  Allstate 
also agreed to pay $40.20 per day for the 24 hour attendant care 
services provided by Mrs. Obusek and other family members.  Those 
payments were to continue for 18 months and the parties where 
then to be free to negotiate further payments.   
 When the 18 month period expired in August of 1982, Allstate 
agreed to continue paying at an increased per diem rate of 
$45.79. The original agreement was extended in all other respects 
for an additional two years, until August 25, 1984.  At the 
conclusion of that two year period, a third agreement was 
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negotiated wherein the per diem was increased to $125, or $45,625 
per year, for a period of four years -- until August 25, 1988. 
The third agreement also provided that upon its expiration, the 
parties would each: 
have the right to request an increase or 
decrease in these payments. . . . should the 
parties be unable to reach such an agreement, 
each party will have the right to seek to 
resolve this issue through appropriate 
litigation pursuant to the Pennsylvania No-
Fault Act. 
 
Allstate also agreed to continue to pay the $125 per day, 
augmented annually by the increase in the consumer price index in 
the event of litigation. 
 In January of 1987, the Plan assigned Lisa's claim to 
Travelers, and Travelers began making the attendant care services 
payments.  As of August, 1988, the insurance companies had paid 
more than $239,800 to the Obuseks for the services provided by 
Lisa's mother.   
 On August 28, 1988 (after the third agreement expired) 
Travelers filed a declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. 
§2201 in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, seeking a determination of whether 
Travelers was obligated to pay Lisa for attendant care services 
provided in her home by her mother.  Travelers asserted three 
reasons why it believed such services were not compensable.   
 First, Travelers contended that Mrs. Obusek's services were 
not compensable because she was not a licensed health care 
provider. Section 103 of the No-Fault Act, 40 Pa.C.S.A. §1009.103 
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stated that the insurer is "not obligated to provide basic loss 
benefits for allowable expense for medical and vocational 
rehabilitation services" if the providers of the services are not 
accredited by the Department of Health of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.  
 Second, Travelers contended that the services being provided 
by Lisa's mother were custodial only, and not rehabilitative. 
Section 103 also required that compensable rehabilitative 
services "reduce disability and. . . restore the . . . 
functioning of the victim."  
 Third, Travelers contended that the services were 
replacement services and that Lisa had already been paid the 
maximum allowable amount for replacement services under the No-
Fault Act. Section 103 defines "replacement services" as 
"ordinary and necessary services in lieu of those the victim 
would have performed, not for income, but for the benefit of 
himself. . . if he had not been injured."  The Act placed a cap 
on the amount of benefits payable for replacement services and 
that limit had been exceeded. 
 Lisa responded to Travelers' suit by filing a counterclaim 
in which she also requested declaratory relief.  She asked the 
court to declare that: 
(1) TRAVELERS is obligated to pay LISA for 
attendant care provided by her family, 
pursuant to the terms of the AGREEMENT 
entered into between LISA and ALLSTATE on 
10/9/84; and that 
 
(2) The daily attendant care payments are to 
be based upon the fair market value of such 
services; and that 
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(3) TRAVELERS is to provide LISA with all the 
products, services and accommodations 
required for LISA's maximum rehabilitation --
and as set forth in the prior AGREEMENTS 
between LISA, ALLSTATE and the PLAN, and as 
stated in the attached EIH evaluation, and as 
otherwise may be required; 
 
(4) TRAVELERS is to pay LISA 18% 
penalty/delay interest as to all products, 
services and accommodations, or the fair 
value thereof, not provided by TRAVELERS --
pursuant to the Pennsylvania No-Fault Act; 
 
(5) TRAVELERS is to pay LISA for counsel fees 
and costs incurred by LISA because of this 
litigation and because of TRAVELERS' failure 
to provide, of (sic) fully pay for, required 
products, services and accommodations. 
 
Lisa also demanded four types of home improvements and 
approximately 30 pieces of equipment. 
 Travelers answered the counterclaim by admitting that it had 
not conducted a recent examination of Lisa and conceding that it 
therefore had no reports which refuted the recommendations 
contained in the EIH evaluation.  However, Travelers did raise as 
a defense its contention that Lisa had never requested any of the 
products or services which the EIH evaluation recommended as 
necessary.  Travelers therefore asserted that the issue of Lisa's 
entitlement to the services and accommodations recommended by EIH 
was not ripe for resolution.  Additionally, Travelers contended 
that it had never been provided with a copy of the EIH evaluation 
until it was attached as an exhibit to the counterclaim.   
 After discovery was completed, the parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.  After some delay, the district 
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court assigned the case to a magistrate judge who issued her 
Report and Recommendation on May 11, 1993, recommending that 
Travelers' summary judgment motion be granted and Lisa's be 
denied.  The magistrate judge based her recommendation on the 
fact that Lisa's mother was not a licensed health care provider. 
The magistrate judge reasoned that Travelers was therefore not 
obligated to pay for Mrs. Obusek's services under the No-Fault 
Act.  Report and Recommendation at 7-8.  However, the magistrate 
judge further concluded that Lisa's claims for home improvements 
and other equipment were not amenable to summary judgment.  Id. 
 The district court adopted the Report and Recommendation 
over the Obuseks' objections and Travelers stopped making monthly 
payments.  Thereafter, on January 7, 1994, at a status 
conference, the parties reached a settlement on all of the home 
improvement and equipment claims contained in Lisa's 
counterclaim.  That settlement was eventually reduced to writing 
and approved by the district court. 
 During that status conference the parties debated whether 
any issues remained outstanding for the court to decide.  Lisa's 
counsel contended that the district court only decided that 
Travelers has no obligation to pay for attendant care services 
provided by Lisa's mother but did not decide whether Travelers 
had any obligation to pay for attendant care services that may be 
provided by a licensed caregiver.  Travelers disagreed and argued 
that the summary judgment in its favor had resolved all of the 
issues in the case. 
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 Following briefing on this issue, the district court issued 
a Memorandum Opinion and Judgment Order dated October 14, 1994, 
in which it ruled that the issue of Travelers' obligation to pay 
for attendant care services, if provided by a licensed care-
giver, was ripe for determination.  The district court then 
granted summary judgment in Lisa's favor, and held that attendant 
care services, if "provided by accredited, non-family 
professional medical treatment and care providers" constitute 
"professional medical treatment and care" within the meaning of 
the No-Fault Act, and therefore, attendant care services are an 
"allowable expense" under the Act. Memorandum Opinion at 11. 
Travelers subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied, and 
this appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
II. Discussion 
 Travelers submits that the only person providing daily care 
services to Lisa is her mother, and that there is nothing in the 
record which shows that Lisa has any plans or intentions to hire 
anyone else to provide those services in the near future. 
Additionally, Travelers contends that no one ever asked that it 
pay for attendant care services provided by an accredited care-
giver.  Travelers suggests that it is therefore entirely 
"speculative whether anyone other than Mrs. Obusek will ever 
provide attendant care services to her daughter."  Brief of 
Appellant at 19.  Accordingly, Travelers argues that the issue of 
its obligation to pay for attendant care services provided by a 
licensed care-giver is not ripe for resolution. 
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A. Ripeness 
 The Declaratory Judgment Act provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
 § 2201. Creation of remedy 
 
  (a) In a case of actual controversy within 
its jurisdiction,. . . any court of the 
United States, upon the filing of an 
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights 
and other legal relations of any interested 
party seeking such declaration, whether or 
not further relief is or could be sought. Any 
such declaration shall have the force and 
effect of a final judgment or decree and 
shall be reviewable as such. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).  Of course, Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution of the United States "limits federal jurisdiction to 
actual 'cases' and 'controversies.'" Armstrong World Industries, 
Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 410 (3d Cir. 1992).  This 
constitutional provision "stands as a direct prohibition on the 
issuance of advisory opinions."  Id.  The existence of a "case or 
controversy" is a condition precedent to the proper exercise of 
judicial power by a federal court and the Declaratory Judgment 
Act can not relax that constitutional requirement. Skelly Oil Co. 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950).  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal 
& Oil Co.: 
The difference between an abstract question 
and a 'controversy' contemplated by the 
Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one 
of degree, and it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to fashion a precise test for 
determining in every case whether there is 
such a controversy.  Basically, the question 
in each case is whether the facts alleged, 
under all the circumstances, show that there 
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is a substantial controversy, between parties 
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient 
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance 
of a declaratory judgment. 
 
312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).  We have previously noted that: 
[t]o satisfy Article III's case or 
controversy requirement, an action must 
present (1) a legal controversy that is real 
and not hypothetical, (2) a legal controversy 
that affects an individual in a concrete 
manner so as to provide the factual predicate 
for reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal 
controversy so as to sharpen the issues for 
judicial resolution. 
 
Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 411 
(3rd. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As will be 
discussed in greater detail infra, as part of our inquiry into 
"ripeness", the instant controversy satisfies this requirement.  
 Federal jurisdiction is also limited by the doctrine of 
"ripeness".  "Ripeness" "determines when a proper party may bring 
an action."  Id.  The function of the ripeness doctrine is to 
prevent federal courts "through avoidance of premature 
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract 
disagreements."  Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 
(1967).  While we have noted that there is some disagreement as 
to whether the ripeness doctrine is grounded in the case or 
controversy requirement or is more properly viewed as a 
"prudential limitation on federal jurisdiction," we recognize 
that the doctrine is at least partially grounded in the case or 
controversy requirement. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 961 
F.2d at 411 n. 12.   
15 
 The parameters of "ripeness" are especially difficult to 
define within the context of declaratory judgment actions.  Step-
Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 646 
(3d Cir. 1990).  This difficulty is due, in large measure, to the 
fact that declaratory judgments are, of necessity, rendered 
before an "accomplished" injury has been suffered.  Id. at 647. 
Nonetheless, we have developed a method of analysis that focuses 
upon three factors to aid in determining if and when a 
declaratory judgment action is ripe.  We examine the "adversity 
of the interest" between the parties to the action, the 
"conclusiveness" of the declaratory judgment and "the practical 
help, or utility" of the declaratory judgment.  Id.  If we are 
satisfied that all three elements are present, the declaratory 
judgment action is ripe.  
1. Adversity of Interests 
 Parties' interests are adverse where harm will result if the 
declaratory judgment is not entered.  Although the action cannot 
be based on a contingency,  Id. at 647-648,  the party seeking 
declaratory relief need not wait until the harm has actually 
occurred to bring the action.  Armstrong World Industries, Inc. 
v. Adams, 961 F.2d at 412.  Thus, in an appropriate circumstance, 
a litigant can seek a declaratory judgment where the harm is 
threatened in the future.  However, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the probability of that future event occurring 
is real and substantial, "'of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.'"  Salvation Army 
v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 
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1990) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974)). 
Accordingly, a party need not decide between attempting to meet 
the nearly insurmountable burden of establishing that the 
relevant injury is a mathematical certainty to occur, nor must a 
party await actual injury before filing suit.  Erecting such 
barriers would eviscerate the Declaratory Judgment Act and render 
the relief it was intended to provide illusory.  However, 
ripeness requires that the threat of future harm must remain 
"real and immediate" throughout the course of the litigation. Id. 
(quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 459 n. 10).  
 Here, Travelers has taken the position that attendant care 
services are custodial in nature and that it therefore has no 
obligation under the No-Fault Act to pay for those services. 
Lisa, of course, contends otherwise.  There is, therefore, a very 
real and immediate adversity of interests. This adversity is not 
negated merely because Travelers' own expert agrees that 
attendant care services are an absolute necessity, and that Lisa 
cannot do without them.  That consideration is, however, relevant 
to the eventual resolution of the adversity of interests.   
2. Conclusiveness 
 The declaratory judgment must also be conclusive.  That is, 
the legal status of the parties must be changed or clarified by 
the declaration.  Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse 
Technology, 912 F.2d at 648.  This portion of the analysis is 
part and parcel of the constitutionally mandated inquiry into the 
existence of a case or controversy.  The "contest must be based 
on a 'real and substantial controversy admitting of specific 
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relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as 
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon 
a hypothetical state of facts.'" Id. at 649 (quoting Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937)).  An integral part 
of the conclusiveness inquiry is the necessity that the court be 
presented with a set of facts from which it can make findings. 
Without a concrete set of facts, the court cannot engage in its 
required fact-finding role and declare the parties' rights based 
on those facts.  Without the necessary facts, the court is left 
to render an advisory opinion.  Id.; Armstrong World Industries, 
Inc., F.2d at 412.   
 Nonetheless, there are situations where the need for 
complete factual development is not absolutely essential.  For 
instance, where the question presented is "predominately legal", 
such as a question of federal preemption, a factual record is not 
as crucial as in a case where the question is whether there has 
been an unconstitutional taking of private property.  Armstrong 
World Industries, Inc., at 412.  There are also situations where 
a declaratory judgment can be issued absent proof of a necessary 
fact.  For example, if a future event is "certain to occur, such 
as enforcement of an existing statute or the death of a life-
tenant or the future expiration of a contract, franchise or 
lease”, a judgment declaring rights is appropriate."   Step-Saver 
Data Systems, Inc., 912 F.2d at 649 n. 7 (quoting EDWIN BORCHARD, 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS at 37-38 (2d Ed. 1941).  
 The conclusiveness of resolution of the instant controversy 
is closely related to the utility of resolving it.  A declaration 
18 
will conclusively establish Lisa's right to receive payment for 
attendant care if that care is given by an appropriate health 
care professional.  Lisa ought not to have to risk incurring the 
financial obligation of such care before knowing if Travelers is 
obligated to pay for it, and the question is primarily a legal 
one involving interpretation of the applicable legislation.  
3. Utility 
 Finally, the declaratory judgment must have utility.  It 
must be of some practical help to the parties.  The Declaratory 
Judgments Act was enacted "to clarify legal relationships so that 
plaintiffs (and possibly defendants) could make responsible 
decisions about the future."  Step-Saver, at 650.  
The idea behind the Act was to clarify legal 
relationships so that [parties] cold make 
responsible decisions about the future.   As 
Congressman Gilbert remarked in debate, 
'[u]nder the present [pre-Declaratory 
Judgment Act] law, you take a step in the 
dark and then turn on the light to see if you 
have stepped in a hole.  Under the 
declaratory judgment law you turn on the 
light and then take the step.' 
 
Id. at 649-50.   
 Contrary to Travelers’ suggestion, we think that the record, 
at least implicitly, reflects that, if her mother’s services are 
not compensable, Lisa Obusek wishes to employ the a licensed 
health care giver to provide the attendant care services that she 
needs.  She need to know whether attendant care services are an 
allowable expense under the No-Fault Act if they are administered 
by a licensed health care professional.  She should not have to 
blindly take the step of incurring an expense that Travelers may 
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be legally obligated to assume before being told if she has 
stepped in a hole.   
B. Plaintiff's Prior Requests For Attendant Care. 
 We do not agree with Travelers' contention that Lisa has 
never asked Travelers to pay for attendant care services provided 
by non-family, accredited care givers.  The EIH Health Care 
Evaluation was attached to her counterclaim and, as recited 
above, the Evaluation recommended attendant care services.  The 
counterclaim specifically requested that the court declare that 
"TRAVELERS is to provide LISA with all the products, services and 
accommodations required for LISA's maximum rehabilitation -- as 
set forth in the prior AGREEMENTS between LISA, ALLSTATE and the 
PLAN, and as stated in the attached EIH evaluation, and as 
otherwise may be required;. . ." (emphasis added). 
 We find that the above-quoted prayer for relief in the 
counterclaim and the EIH Evaluation attached to the counterclaim 
is a clear and unequivocal demand for attendant care services 
under the No-Fault Act. 
 Finally, it is obvious that a declaratory judgment here will 
be of practical help to the parties.  When the question of 
Travelers' obligation to pay for attendant care services provided 
by an accredited care-giver is finally resolved, Lisa and her 
family can make decisions about the future and Travelers will 
know the extent of its liability. 
 Accordingly, the issue of Travelers' obligation under the 
No-Fault Act to pay for attendant care services provided by an 
accredited care-giver is ripe for resolution. 
20 
 
C. Allowable Expenses 
 The No-Fault Act allowed persons injured in automobile 
accidents to recover "allowable expense[s]."  The Act defined 
such expenses in relevant part, as follows: 
"Allowable expense" means reasonable charges 
incurred for, or the reasonable value of 
(where no charges are incurred), reasonably 
needed and used products, services and 
accommodations for: 
 
(A) professional medical treatment and care; 
 
(B) emergency health services; 
 
(C) medical and vocational rehabilitation 
services; 
 
(D) expenses directly related to the funeral, 
burial, cremation, or other form of 
disposition of the remains of a deceased 
victim, not to exceed one thousand five 
hundred ($1,500) dollars;. . . 
 
40 Pa.C.S.A. § 1009.103 (repealed).  The parties agree that the 
attendant care in dispute here does not fall under the category 
of "emergency health services.”0  Lisa does contend, however, 
that her attendant care needs do fit within the definition of 
“professional medical treatment and care” and “medical 
rehabilitation services.”0  
                                                           
0
"Emergency health services" refer to emergency services 
administered by emergency medical personnel. Id.  
0Although Lisa is arguing that her attendant care requirements 
are medical rehabilitation services, we note that to the extent 
that attendant care would not reduce Lisa’s disability or restore 
her functioning, the cost for those services would not be 
recoverable as “medical and vocational rehabilitation services” 
under the No-Fault Act.  Reilly v. SEPTA, 489 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 
1985).  Whether or not attendant care services which would tend 
to reduce disability or to restore functioning are recoverable 
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 The district court concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court's decision in Drake v. Pennsylvania National Mutual 
Casualty Ins. Co., 601 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1992), controlled its 
analysis.  The court held that, under Drake, attendant care 
"provided by accredited non-family, professional medical 
treatment and care providers" is an allowable expense under 
Section 103 of the Act,  Memorandum Opinion at 11, and therefore 
granted summary judgment to Lisa on her attendant care claim.0  
 Travelers argues that Drake is not controlling; that 
attendant care services are not an allowable expense under the 
Act even if provided by accredited care-givers; and that it 
therefore has no obligation to pay for such services.  In Drake, 
Millard Fertig suffered serious spinal injuries when the 
automobile he was driving was struck from behind by another car. 
As a result of the injuries, Fertig was rendered quadriplegic. He 
received in-patient hospital care for approximately two months 
and then was released to his home with special equipment and 
nursing care.  However, within a year of the accident, he was 
admitted to a nursing home where he remained until his death 
approximately 5 years later. 
 Fertig's automobile was covered by insurance under the No-
Fault Act and his carrier paid all of the costs of his medical 
treatments.  However, approximately three years before his death, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
under the Act as “medical and vocational rehabilitation services” 
appears to be an open question under Pennsylvania law and is a 
question which we do not decide today.  
0We exercise plenary review over the district court's grant of 
summary judgment. Nathanson v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 
926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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the carrier filed a state-court declaratory judgment action to 
determine its obligation to pay for Fertig's room charges in the 
nursing home under the No-Fault Act.  The carrier argued that it 
was not liable for the room charges because Fertig "was receiving 
only custodial care at the home rather than medical or 
rehabilitative treatment."  Drake, 601 A.2d 797, 798-799. 
 At trial, the carrier presented medical testimony that 
Fertig had reached the point in his rehabilitation where he was 
no longer a candidate for physical therapy "and was receiving 
only maintenance and supportive care."  Id. at 799. However, one 
physician testified that Fertig needed periodic review of his 
bladder and bowel functions, that he required skilled nursing 
care or his condition could regress, and that even though he was 
not a candidate for rehabilitation he needed medical and nursing 
care because of his condition.  Id.  
 The trial court found that Fertig's medical condition 
required the care he was receiving at the nursing home and that 
Fertig's no-fault carrier had to pay that cost under the Act. 
Accordingly, the trial court ordered the carrier to pay for all 
of Fertig's charges at the nursing home including that portion of 
the charges that resulted from only custodial care.   
 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed, holding 
that under Reilly v. SEPTA, 489 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 1985), no-fault 
carriers have no obligation to pay for expenses that are merely 
custodial.  See Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. 
Fertig, 555 A.2d 208 (Pa. Super. 1989).  In so deciding, the 
Superior Court quoted Reilly stating:  "[s]ervices which do not 
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reduce the disability of the victim or restore his functioning, 
being custodial in nature, would not be recoverable under the No-
Fault Act. . . ."  555 A.2d at 209, (quoting Reilly, 489 A.2d at 
1303).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then granted allocatur: 
[t]o consider whether such custodial care 
might be 'medical care' payable by the 
insurer as an allowable expense under 40 P.S. 
§ 1009.103 even though Reilly held that it 
was not the responsibility of the insurer 
because it was not "rehabilitation" under 
§103. 
 
601 A.2d at 799. 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the Superior 
Court's reliance on Reilly had been misplaced and reversed.  601 
A.2d at 800. The court reasoned that Reilly only held that 
custodial care that was not rehabilitative was not recoverable as 
"medical and vocational rehabilitation services."  However, "[i]t 
was never suggested that custodial, non-rehabilitative care might 
nonetheless be 'medical care' recoverable from a no-fault carrier 
as another type of allowable expense, namely 'professional 
medical treatment and care.'"  Id. 
 The Court noted that the purpose of the No-Fault Act was to 
provide prompt and adequate basic loss benefits to victims of 
motor vehicle accidents and to guarantee that accident victims 
receive prompt and comprehensive professional treatment.  Id. The 
court also noted that under Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction 
Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(c), the No-Fault Act "must be liberally 
construed to effectuate its purposes, erring in favor of coverage 
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for the insured in close or doubtful cases." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 The court ruled that Fertig's nursing home accommodations 
would be covered under the No-Fault Act if the accommodations 
were necessary either as "professional medical treatment and 
care" or "medical and vocational rehabilitation services."  The 
court concluded that if the cost of Fertig's nursing home 
accommodations was an allowable expense, then the room charges, 
i.e., custodial care charges, were covered as well. Id. at 801. 
Although Reilly precluded no-fault coverage for non-
rehabilitative custodial care, the court determined "that 
entitlement for the cost of 'professional medical treatment and 
care' may include medically necessary nursing services even if 
the services may be characterized as custodial."  Id.  Thus, 
Fertig's nursing home accommodations were payable by his no-fault 
carrier as "professional medical treatment and care,"  and 
constituted an allowable expense under the Act even if some of 
the services included in those charges were custodial in nature 
as long as the custodial services were "necessary due to 
accident-related injuries."  Id.   
 The analysis in Drake was based, in part, on language 
contained in Fertig's no-fault policy with the carrier.  That 
policy covered reasonable charges incurred for "professional 
medical treatment and care" which included "hospital and 
professional nursing services for diagnosis, care, and recovery. 
. . ." Id.  Here, there is no insurance policy because Lisa's 
claim was processed under the Assigned Claims Plan.  Nonetheless, 
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we do not believe that the absence of a policy which defines 
"professional medical treatment and care" is crucial to the 
resolution of this case.  The Drake court noted that the No-Fault 
Act does not define "professional medical treatment and care".  
Additionally, the court noted that neither the No-Fault Act nor 
31 Pa. Code § 66.102 (which sets forth a sample No-Fault 
insurance policy) excludes custodial care from the definition of 
"professional medical treatment and care."  Drake at 801.   
 Under Drake, custodial services that are administered as 
part of professional medical treatment and care are an allowable 
expense under the No-Fault Act so long as they are required 
because of accident-related injuries.  See also, American 
Motorists Insurance Co. v. Farmers Bank and Trust Co. of Hanover, 
644 A.2d 1232 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
 In Farmers Bank and Trust Co., American Motorists, the no-
fault carrier, filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking 
to be relieved of its obligation to pay for nursing home services 
which it characterized as "custodial care".  Id. at 1233. Farmers 
Bank, the guardian of the estate of the person injured in the 
automobile accident, filed an answer and then moved for judgment 
on the pleadings, alleging that it was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law because the no-fault carrier failed to raise the 
issue of whether the nursing home care was related to the 
accident.  The trial court granted the motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and the no-fault carrier appealed.   
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 A panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the 
trial court's grant of the motion for judgment on the pleadings.0 
In reaching that decision, the court commented as follows:  
   In Drake v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. 
Ins. Co.,. . ., our supreme court held that, 
under the No-Fault Act, there is no per se 
exclusion for expenses related to medical and 
nursing care which is custodial; and that the 
cost of custodial care was an allowable 
expense under the applicable no-fault 
automobile policy under the No-Fault Act, so 
long as it was necessary due to accident 
related injuries.  Thus, the fact that the 
insured is receiving custodial care does not, 
of itself, relieve the insurer of the 
responsibility of the cost of his care. 
Rather, the insurer must, in terms of a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, allege 
not only that the care is custodial, but also 
that the care in unrelated to the accident, 
in order to be relieved of the financial 
responsibility for the costs of this type of 
care. 
 
644 A.2d at 1235 (citations omitted).  Accord, Gallagher v. 
Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co., 617 A.2d 790, (Pa. Super., 
1992) ("custodial services are compensable under § 1009.103 as an 
allowable expense of a professional medical treatment or care.") 
 Travelers is arguing that custodial care in the form of 
attendant care is not compensable under the Act even if 
administered by accredited health care professionals.  
                                                           
0Although the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's grant of 
the motion for judgment on the pleadings in regard to the 
carrier's failure to plead that the care was unrelated to the 
accident, the Superior Court reversed the trial court on the 
trial court's finding that the four year statute of limitations 
for declaratory judgment actions barred the no-fault carrier from 
amending its complaint.  644 A.2d at 1235. 
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 It is beyond dispute that if Lisa were institutionalized in 
a rehabilitation center or nursing home Travelers would be 
obligated to pay the cost of custodial care that she received. 
See Drake, supra.  Travelers' argument here is merely a 
restatement of the position that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
ruled against in Drake. The only distinction we perceive between 
Drake and its progeny on the one hand, and Lisa's claim on the 
other hand, is that Lisa has chosen to remain at home rather than 
be institutionalized.  That choice cannot defeat her claim for 
No-Fault benefits.  She needs attendant care because of her 
accident-related injuries, and Travelers cannot argue otherwise. 
Travelers' own expert opined that Lisa should have a licensed 
practical nurse available to her to change her Foley catheter and 
to supervise the attendant care "so that it is done effectively 
or any time she runs into respiratory, skin, autonomic, or GU 
complications."  Joint Appendix at 473a.  In addition to nursing 
supervision of her general attendant care, Lisa needs review of 
her bowel functions, including periodic artificial stimulation. 
This attention to bowel and bladder functions is similar to the 
kind of care Fertig was receiving in the nursing home in Drake 
and is, we believe, the kind of care that led the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to find that Fertig's nursing home accommodations 
were "professional medical treatment and care."   
 A contrary conclusion would mean that Lisa can only receive 
the attendant services she needs if she is taken from her own 
home and placed in a professional care facility such as a nursing 
home.  Yet, such a result would not benefit either party to this 
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dispute.  It would add to Travelers' costs, and relegate Lisa to 
an institution.  Accordingly, we find that the attendant care 
services needed by Lisa are an allowable expense under Section 
103(A) of the No-Fault Act.0 
 Nevertheless, after a careful review of the record, we are 
concerned that the district court did not adequately address the 
exact nature and type of attendant care services Lisa requires. 
It appears that the district court assumed that Lisa would need 
the attendant care services outlined in the EIH Evaluation, 
however the court never made a finding to that effect. See 
Memorandum Opinion at 5 n. 3.0   It is, of course, entirely 
possible that the district court intended that the "attendant 
care services" at issue are those set forth in the comprehensive 
and detailed EIH recommendation attached to the counterclaim and 
a formal finding to that effect may, therefore, be all that is 
necessary. In its order dated October 14, 1994, the court simply 
declared that Lisa was entitled to payment for all "'allowable 
expenses' under the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Act . . . and [Drake]."  However, declaring that Travelers is 
liable for all payments required by law does not provide either 
side to this dispute the clarification the parties are entitled 
                                                           
0Because we hold that attendant care services are an allowable 
expense under Section 103(A) of the No-Fault Act, it is 
unnecessary to consider Travelers' argument that the attendant 
care services are "replacement services" and therefore subject to 
the statutory limit for payment for replacement services that has 
already been met. 
0Travelers apparently assumed for purposes of this appeal that 
the attendant care services needed by Ms. Obusek are the same 
services that her mother has been providing to her since 
1980.  Brief of Appellant at 22 n. 10. 
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to.  Accordingly, we will remand for a determination of the 
nature and type of attendant care services which are appropriate 
for Lisa's needs.  If the district court concludes that those 
services are sufficiently set forth in the EIH report it may, of 
course, make a finding of fact to that effect.  
 
IV. 
 For the above reasons, we will reverse the district court’s 
judgment and remand for a determination of the nature and type of 
attendant care services required by Lisa. 
 
                           
